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THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY AND ESKIMO 
WHALING 
Nathaniel M. Rosenblatt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The northern reaches of Alaska have become the setting for a 
peculiar twentieth century drama. Long the scene of life-or-death 
struggles between man and nature, the Arctic today stands as a 
backdrop for a controversy involving a dying animal and a dying 
way of life. The animal is the bowhead whale; the humans involved 
are Inupiat Eskimos. Although their relationship has lasted for cen-
turies, it may soon be necessary to choose between the preservation 
of the whale and the preservation of the Eskimo culture. 
Nine Eskimo villages along the Bering Sea and north coast of 
Alaska annually participate in bowhead whaling. The names of the 
villages are unfamiliar to most Americans-Barrow, Point Hope, 
Gambell, Savoonga, Wales, Kivalina, Wainwright, Kaktovik and 
Nuiqsut l - yet the people in these towns have undertaken a major 
battle against what they feel is unwarranted interference with the 
Eskimo way of life. 
Eskimos have long hunted bowheads as a source of food, 2 conse-
quently creating a cultural tradition unique to Alaska. Indeed, the 
bowhead permeates all facets of Eskimo life. Not only is the bow-
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
I Most villages hunt during the spring migration of the bowhead north from the Bering Sea. 
Kaktovik and Nuiqsut hunt during the fall, wl,1ile Barrow hunts during the spring and fall. 
See 43 Fed. Reg. 43,026 (1978). 
2 Much anthropological research has been done on Eskimos. Three books containing valua-
ble cultural information are: (1) Murdoch, Ethnological Results. of the Point Barrow 
Expedition, in NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY (J. Powell ed. 
1892); (2) J. VANSTONE, POINT HOPE: AN ESKIMO VILLAGE IN TRANSITION (1962); and (3) K. 
JOSEPHSON, ALASKA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1974). 
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head important to the Eskimo diet,3 but the bowhead hunt itself 
plays a central role in the Eskimo culture, providing physical exer-
cise, acting as a prime component of the village's social, economic 
and political structure and shaping in many respects the Eskimo 
relationship with the non-native world. 4 While it is understood 
within the Eskimo communities that a functioning relationship 
must be maintained with the "outside" and that some aspects of 
native life consequently have been altered, "there is strong resist-
ance to change from a basically subsistence life to the non-native 
cash economy world."5 
The Bering Sea stock of bowheads hunted by the Eskimos has 
been in critical danger of extinction since uncontrolled commercial 
whaling in the nineteenth century cut the population to a small 
fraction of its original size. Both the International Whaling Com-
mission (IWC) and the United States have moved to protect the 
bowhead. As a result, they have threatened the Eskimo lifestyle. 
This article will focus on the policy decisions that must be made 
and the balancing of interests that must be undertaken when exam-
ining the conflict between Eskimos seeking to preserve their subsist-
ence culture and those people desiring to protect the bowhead 
whale. To fully analyze the problem, this article will first set forth 
a brief description of the bowhead whale and hunting practices, 
both past and present. International and domestic efforts to protect 
3 Whale meat is a major component of the Eskimo diet. It is high in protein, vitamins and 
calories and appears irreplaceable, especially given Eskimo taste preferences. Each village 
itself consumes most of the bowhead catch, whale parts being distributed through the families 
of whaling crew members. Some meat is saved for village festivals in the fall and spring, while 
some is saved for Thanksgiving and Christmas. Meat and blubber are also used in trade, with 
an estimated 10,000 Eskimos and Indians in interior Alaska supplementing their diets with 
meat from marine mammals. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT, INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION'S DELETION OF NATIVE EXEMPTION FOR THE 
SUBSISTENCE HARVEST OF BOWHEAD WHALES, Vol. I, at 47 (Oct. 1977) [hereinafter cited as 1 
FEIS] .. 
• Traditionally, harpoons and lances made from stone, ivory and bone and the skin-covered 
vessel called an umiak, were the implements used to hunt the bowhead. However, the period 
of commercial hunting of the bowhead in the last century, during which Eskimos oftentimes 
assisted in the commercial catches, introduced the Eskimos to more modern hunting meth-
ods. Although the umiak is still the most common whaling vessel, Eskimos today hunt with 
the weapons and techniques of a more modern whaling era, characterized by the use of darting 
and shoulder guns. Each year three or four months are needed to gather and repair equip-
ment, and considerable time is spent readying the umiaks. Ice camps located near the breaks 
in the ice through which the whales migrate become the center of village activity for the four 
or five weeks of the migration. One sign of change is that snowmobiles now do the work of 
dog teams. [d. at 36. 














' ••.• :.' .:'~-' LOCATION OF MAJOR WHALING VILLAGES. 
CANADA 
SOllrce: U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bowhead Whales C-3 (1978). 
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the bowhead will then be discussed, including the actions of IWC 
which established quotas for aboriginal hunting of the bowhead. 
Finally, the article will discuss the trust relationship which may 
exist between the United States and the Eskimos, and the potential 
breach by the United States of obligations stemming from that 
relationship in acting to protect the bowhead. 
II. THE BOWHEAD WHALE 
A. General Characteristics 
Also known as the Greenland whale, the Greenland right whale, 
the Arctic right whale and the great polar whale, the bowhead 
'(Balaena mysticetus) is a large balaenid cetacean6 whose head com-
prises one-third of its entire body. Adults average about sixty feet 
in length.7 The whales have a dark gray coloring, although they 
often have white marks on the underside or chin.s The name 
"bowhead" is derived from the arch shape of the whale's mouth, 
while the name "right" comes from the usage of past commercial 
whalers who believed the animal was the "right" whale to hunt due 
to its value, slowness and buoyancy after death. 9 
Scientists lack information concerning many important biological 
traits of the bowhead, including the whale's mating season, its ges-
tation, calving and lactation periods, and the longevity of members 
of the species. lo This scarcity of needed data results in uncertainty 
in estimating the health of a given bowhead stock. II Further re-
• Baleen whales include the Balaenidae family of which the bowhead is a member. 
[They] are characterized by a double row of whalebone or baleen plates hanging from 
the roof of the mouth. These plates are used to strain the food from seawater, usually 
euphausid shrimps, copepods, or fish. There is a thick layer of oil-rich blubber beneath 
the skin. 
These animals have been the most harried and hunted of all the whale species, and some 
are now close to extinction. Originally they were hunted for their baleen alone, later for 
their oil and eventually for their meat as well. 
D. GASKIN, WHALES, DOLPHINS AND SEALS 65 (1972). 
1 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 26. 
MId. at 26-28. 
• The term "right" actually applied more specifically to the North Atlantic right whale or 
black right whale (B. glacialis) and was extended to include two closely related species, the 
bowhead and the southern right whale. See C. HAWES, WHALING 2-3 (1924). 
10 See 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 27-30. For more on whales, whaling and whale management, 
see Scarff, The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisci-
plinary Assessment (pts. 1-2), 6 ECOL. L.Q. 323, 571 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Scarff]. 
" See text at notes 27-32, infra. A whale "stock" is a "genetically distinguishable breeding 
unit within a species." Scarff, supra note 10, at 334. 
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search may provide a more definite indication of the status of the 
bowhead, but the difficulties inherent in studying the population 
dynamics of whales in their natural habitat make only tentative 
results attainable in the near future. 12 However, among the scientific 
community there is general agreement that the bowhead is "one of 
the most endangered species of large whales."13 
B. The Bering Sea Bowhead Stock 
At the height of its population, the bowhead was fully distributed 
in the seas around the North Pole.14 Today, however, only four, or 
possibly five, principal arctic and subarctic bowhead stocks re-
main. 15 The bowhead stock hunted by the Alaskan Eskimos winters 
in the waters of the Bering Sea and migrates north to the Chukchi 
and Beaufort Seas in the spring. 16 The whales move with the ice, 
generally remaining near the loose edge of the ice pack, although 
sometimes they are found in open water .17 In the spring migration, 
the bowheads usually travel singly or in pairs, often in the company 
12 These difficulties stem from the sheer size of most whales-thus making observation in 
captivity practically impossible-and the fact that many species of whale never come near 
land. See id. at 333. 
13 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 6. A look at population statistics explains why. Very few 
bowheads remain in the Spitzbergen stock (initial size estimated at 25,000) and Okhotsk 
stock (initial size estimated at 6500). The Davis Strait stock presently is about 10 percent of 
its initial size of about 6000, while the newly recognized Hudson Bay stock numbers about 
15 percent of an original stock estimated at 700.2 FEIS, supra note 3, at App. C. The Bering 
Sea stock is at best near 20 percent of initial stock size (assuming a present population of 
2264 out of an initial stock of 11,700). See notes 27 and 58, infra. InternAtional protection for 
whales from commercial harvesting begins at 54 percent of initial stock size. See note 50, 
infra. For an outline of the various bowhead stocks, see note 15, infra. 
II 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 26 . 
.. These stocks are found in the following areas: 
(1) From Spitzbergen west to east Greenland; 
(2) In Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Hudson Bay and adjacent waters (the Hudson Bay 
population may be a separate stock); 
(3) In the Bering, Chukchi, Beaufort and East Siberian Seas; and 
(4) In the Okhotsk Sea. 
[d. This article deals solely with the Bering Sea stock of bowheads . 
.. The bowhead's migration habits have been described as follows: 
The bowhead's spring migration route passes between St. Lawrence Island and the Chuk-
chi Peninsula, through the Beaufort Sea to the Banks Island region and the MacKenzie 
River delta. Some may also migrate through the Bering Strait and then along the Siberian 
coast. The peak spring migration period is from March through July .... In autumn, the 
whales migrate westward along the north coast of Alaska to the vicinity of Wrangell 
Island, where they turn southward along the coast of the U.S.S.R. to the Bering Sea. 
[d. at 27. 
17 [d. at 26. 
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of smaller white whales, while in the autumn migration back to the 
Bering Sea, the bowheads are sometimes seen in groups numbering 
up to fifty animals. IS 
Commercial whaling of the Bering Sea population of bowheads, 
which began in 1848, decimated the stock.1U Catches in the mid-
1880's averaged 200 whales per year20 from a stock that originally 
numbered somewhere between 11,700 and 18,000 animals. 21 After 
the turn of the century, as the stock shrank, exploitation of the 
species slowed. The last recorded whaling voyage to the western 
Arctic occurred in 1916, although Alaskan trading companies con-
tinued to deal in whalebone for several more years.22 
In 1931 all stocks of the bowhead received shelter from commer-
cial expeditions by 'way of international agreement.23 Today, com-
mercial hunting is banned on the international level by the 1946 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling24 and on the 
domestic level by both the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 19722• 
and the Endangered Species Act of 1973.26 
C. Present Status of the Bering Sea Bowhead 
Because of the difficulty in studying the population dynamics of 
whales in general, it is impossible at this time to know either the 
actual status of the bowhead or the effect of Eskimo whaling on the 
future prospects of the species. Until further research and record 
keeping provide a sound statistical basis, any decision setting per-
missible levels of Eskimo hunting will be a result of an almost ran-
dom selection of numbers, and will have little factual justification. 
Three pieces of data are central to an adequate evaluation of the 
status of the Bering Sea bowhead stock. The first is an estimate of 
" [d. at 27. 
" See id. at 32·34, 43·44. 
2. [d. at 43·44. 
21 [d. at 34. 
22 [d. at 44. 
23 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, art. 4, 49 Stat. 3079, 155 
L.N.T.S. 349. This was followed by the Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, June 8, 
1937, art. 4, 52 Stat. 1460, 190 L.N.T.S. 79. 
" International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 
T.l.A.S. No. 1849. The bowhead is also listed as an endangered species in the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, March 3, 1973, 27 
U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249. 
25 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361·1407 (1976). 
" 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531·1543 (1976). The bowhead was listed as an endangered species in 35 
Fed. Reg. 18,320 (1970). 
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present stock size. The only reliable estimate of Bering Sea bowhead 
stock size was made in 1978 and resulted in a figure of 2264 whales.2i 
This number is a starting point for future research. However, since 
there are no reliable past population figures for comparison, no con-
clusions can be drawn as to the health of the species. In other words, 
no way exists of knowing whether the present figure of 2264 repre-
sents an increase or decrease in the Bering Sea stock since the end 
of commercial whaling. Since no population trend can yet be ascer-
tained, the single 1978 population figure does not show whether the 
bowhead is slowly dying out or is gradually recovering from even 
lower population levels. 
The next important piece of information necessary to ascertain 
the status of the stock is the net recruitment rate for bowhead 
whales. Net recruitment rate is defined as the rate at which juvenile 
animals enter the adult population minus the rate of natural mor-
tality among adults.28 The maximum net recruitment rate for baleen 
whales is estimated to be between four and five percent,29 which 
means that, with an estimated stock of 2264 animals, the number 
of bowheads will naturally increase in one year by between 90 and 
113 whales. Some scientists, however, think that the recruitment 
27 Until the 1978 count the major uncertainty in bowhead studies was stock size. Prior 
estimates had ranged from 400 to 3000 whales and were a source of some confusion. During 
the spring migration in 1978, however, observers 'from the National Marine Fisheries Service 
sighted over 1700 whales moving northward. The estimate of 2264 animals is based on this 
sighting. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BOWHEAD WHALES 2 (1978). This document is a good 
update of the 1977 Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 3. It provides a detailed 
account of the 1978 spring hunt and the bowhead research program presently underway. 
28 See Scarff, supra note 10, at 335-36. 
2t 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 38. It should be noted that historically the bowhead catch has 
fluctuated significantly, with very successful whaling seasons alternating with very poor 
whaling seasons, throughout this century. 
Hunting figures for 1973-77 are as follows: 
known number known number 
killed struck 
number landed but lost and lost 
1973 37 0 10 
1974 20 3 28 
1975 15 2 26 
1976 48 8 35 
1977 (spring) 26 2 77 
[d. at 245. It is believed that about one-half of the whales that are struck by Eskimo hunters 
but lost subsequently die. [d. at 43. 
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rate drops dramatically as a whale stock approaches extinction, and 
cite a recent count which found calves to comprise less than one and 
one-half percent of the total bowhead population.30 
The third piece of data necessary for an evaluation of the health 
of the bowhead stock is critical stock size, the population below 
which the bowhead cannot recover.31 If the present population is 
under critical stock size, even a total ban OIi Eskimo whaling will 
not save the bowhead from eventual demise. 
Since a relatively reliable estimate of present stock size is now 
available, current research is focusing on estimates of net recruit-
ment rate and critical stock size. 32 Only after dependable figures are 
calculated can scientists determine the effect of Eskimo whaling on 
the present bowhead stock. 
D. Eskimo Whaling Activities 
Subsistence harvesting of the bowhead has continued for centu-
ries. The annual harvest for Alaskan Eskimos33 averaged about ten 
whales for the years 1946 to 1970, but increased to twenty-nine 
during the period from 1970 to 1976.34 This increase in actual whale 
take during the 1970's partially stemmed from a greater whaling 
effort by the Eskimos, as measured by the number of crews setting 
out each season.35 Several factors contributed to this increase in 
whaling effort. First, population in the Eskimo whaling villages has 
risen dramatically, almost doubling in the past twenty-five years.36 
Second, even though the means of attaining status have been af-
fected to some degree by the influence of western education and the 
introduction of a cash economy, the status of "whaling captain" still 
carries much prestige in the village community, being associated 
30 The actual figure, calculated from sightings in the spring of 1978, was approximately 1.3 
percent. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BOWHEAD WHALES 29 (1978). "This value does not consider 
calf mortality and also should be viewed with extreme caution because of the bias associated 
with the difficulty of seeing calves swimming by beyond more than a few hundred yards." 
[d. 
31 See Scarff, supra note 10, at 389-90. 
32 This research is being carried out by the National Marine Fisheries Service. See U.S. 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BOWHEAD WHALES 13 (1978). 
33 Canadian Eskimos are not known to hunt the Bering Sea bowhead. Soviet Eskimos are 
believed to currently take about two bowheads a year. 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 35. 
34 [d. at 37. . 
35 See id. at 243. 
"" There were 2048 people in the whaling villages (excluding Nuiqsut) in 1950, while in 1976 
the figure stood at 4211-a change of over 100 percent. [d. at 38. The population of Nuiqsut, 
established recently, was 212 in 1976. [d. at 244. 
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with the attributes of skill, intelligence, energy and business ability. 
The increased availability of cash in the villages which resulted 
from the settlement of native land claims and the development of 
North Slope oil37 consequently has led more and more Eskimos to 
use their new-found resources to take to the icy water to hunt the 
bowhead.38 A third factor contributing to more whaling activity is 
the weather, which apparently was especially good in 1976. 39 Fi-
nally, some argue that increased whaling efforts are related to a 
"crash" in the number of Alaska caribou, an alternative Eskimo 
food source. 40 
Concomitant with the rise in whaling activity came an increase 
in the number of whales struck during the hunt but then lost before 
being killed. It is believed that about one-half of these bowheads die 
soon after they are lost}' Most likely this development resulted from 
the lack of experience of many of the new whaling crews. Tradition-
ally, a whale is struck first by a darting gun, the use of which 
involves considerable skill and courage. This gun fires a bomb into 
the whale and implants a harpoon attached to a line and float. A 
second bomb, if necessary, is usually fired almost immediately from 
another darting gun, but this time no harpoon or line is attached. 
If more bombs are needed, or if it is not safe to approach the 
wounded bowhead, the whalers use a- shoulder gun to fire a large 
explosive charge into the animal. The newer, more inexperienced 
crews tended to use the shoulder gun first, resulting in a wounded 
animal which was unsecured by any harpoon and which frequently 
37 The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 (1976), provided for 
the extinguishment of all native land claims. In return, Alaskan natives received fee title to 
40 million acres of land and a total cash settlement of $962.5 million. $462.5 million of this 
settlement is to be paid directly from the United States Treasury, id. § 1605, while the 
remaining $500 million is to be derived from a revenue sharing scheme involving mineral 
leases on Alaskan public lands. [d. § 1608. Revenues from mineral leases of native lands go 
to the native corporations organized under the Act. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1018 (D. Alaska 1977). 
38 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 39 . 
.. [d. at 40 . 
•• Since 1972, the number of caribou has plunged to only a quarter of prior levels. [d. at 
65. The annual caribou harvest is presently limited by the State of Alaska. U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, BOWHEAD WHALES 60 (1978). A recovery of the caribou herd to earlier levels, 
however, would not make all hunting of the bowhead unnecessary. Apart from the cultural 
significance of the whale hunt, whale meat plays a distinct role in the Eskimo diet and 
seemingly cannot be replaced completely. For a good update on the subsistence role of the 
bowhead in Eskimo life, see id. at 55-61. 
" 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 43. 
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eluded its pursuers,42 
The Eskimo hunts of the mid-1970's took place at a time when 
the international community was finally taking some action to stop 
the commercial slaughter of many species of whale around the 
world. As general global sensitivity to the plight of whales increased, 
the particular case of the bowhead and its Eskimo hunter also re-
ceived greater scrutiny. 43 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION AND THE BOWHEAD 
The International Whaling Commission (IWC), established in 
1946, has played a central role in the bowhead controversy. Pres-
ently composed of representatives of sixteen nations,44 IWC must 
carry out two seemingly contradictory missions: conserve whale 
stocks and ensure the orderly development of the whaling industry.45 
The main annual work product of the Commission consists of a 
schedule regulating the whaling activities of its members. This 
schedule must provide for "the conservation, development and opti-
mum utilization of whale resources" and, at the same time, consider 
"the interests of the consumers of whale products and the whaling 
industry."48 Initially, IWC emphasized the interests of the whalers, 
basically serving as a spokesman and coordinator for whaling inter-
estsY In recent years, however, IWC has assumed a more conserva-
42 [d. at 42. 
" See text at notes 51-62, infra. Another possible danger to the bowhead has developed with 
the exploitation of the oil resources of northern Alaska. Barge and steamer traffic could 
disrupt bowhead migrations. Any oil spill from a vessel in Arctic waters, or from any future 
off-shore drilling activity, may pose a pollution hazard to the bowhead. Those who favor a 
total ban on bowhead hunting cite what they consider to be the inevitable environmental 
pressures the bowhead will have to face in the Arctic and believe that the bowhead stock 
should not be subjected to an additional strain in the form of Eskimo hunting. See 1 FEIS, 
supra note 3, at 30-31. 
44 Fourteen nations were partners to the initial IWC convention-Australia, Brazil, Canada 
Chile, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, South Africa, the 
U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States-while in 1977 there were seventeen 
members (Argentina, Iceland, Japan, Mexico and Panama having adhered to the convention 
while Chile and Peru had withdrawn). Mason, The Bowhead Whale Controversy: Background 
and Aftermath of Adams v. Vance, 2 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 363, 364 n.4 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Mason]. Panama withdrew from IWC as of June 30, 1978.77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 919 
(1977). 
" International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2,1946, preamble, 62 Stat. 
1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849. 
4ft International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. V, para. 2, 62 
Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849. 
47 For a brief history of IWC regulation of whaling, see Scarff, supra note 10, at 358-73. 
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tionist approach to whaling. 48 The Commission's Scientific Commit-
tee4D suggests proper catch levels on a scientific basis, utilizing a new 
approach to whale management known as the New Management 
Procedure. 50 
IWC's concern with the particular predicament of the bowhead 
has continued since 1972 when the Scientific Committee first asked 
the full Commission to request that Denmark, the United States 
and the Soviet Union collect data on aboriginal hunting of the bow-
head. 51 The Committee especially requested that IWC "urge the 
United States to take steps to reduce the waste due to lost whales 
of all species in its aboriginal fishery."52 In 1973 the Scientific Com-
mittee noted that all of the thirty-seven bowheads taken during the 
previous year were taken by American Eskimos, and repeated its 
.. This is to be expected as more and more IWC members cease whaling and global whale 
populations decline. 
It is generally quite difficult to separate the science from the politics when analyzing any 
IWC action. This stems from the friction between the world's two major whaling na-
tions-Japan and the Soviet Union-and the conservationist camp generally led by the 
United States. 
In late 1978, the Soviet Union announced its intention to retire its whaling fleet in the next 
few years. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1978, at 9, col. 1. The decision was an economic one. Soviet 
whaling ships are aging and it has most likely been determined that replacement is not 
worthwhile or, in other words, that whaling is no longer profitable to the extent that replace-
ment is justifiable. The result of this Soviet decision is that, unless the developing countries 
that presently account for a small proportion of world whaling catches join IWC, the Commis-
sion will become an international body dedicated mainly to the control of the Japanese 
whaling industry . 
.. While, an IWC member may send several representatives to the Scientific Committee, 
each member state has only one vote to cast in Scientific Committee decision making. The 
Committee sets quotas and monitors whale stocks by reviewing catch data and research 
reports submitted by member nations. See Scarff, supra note 10, at 355. 
5. For a detailed discussion, see id. at 369-70, 387-400. Briefly, the New Management 
Procedure is based on an optimum whaling population which will theoretically produce the 
largest whale harvest indefinitely. From this theoretical population, which is 60 percent of 
original stock size and is called the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) level, other popula-
tion categories are established. For example, a whale stock reaches "protection" levels when 
it drops more than 10 percent below the MSY level (to 54 percent of original stock size). 
Commercial harvesting of that stock is then halted. See 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 9, 19. The 
United States was instrumental in promoting the New Management Procedure, intending it 
to place IWC quotas on a sound scientific footing. The system has, as a practical result, made 
it more difficult for a nation to oppose an IWC action, since by doing so that nation is 
disregarding current scientific judgment. See Mason, supra note 44, at 366. 
51 1972 Scientific Committee Report, in TWENTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE IWC 34, reprinted 
in Memorandum from W. Aron to W. Brewer (National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration, Aug. 9, 1977) [hereinafter cited as NOAA Memo] at 1 and in 1 FEIS, supra 
note 3, at 12. 
52 Id. 
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request that IWC "urge the United States to continue to study the 
problem [of the loss of whales in its aboriginal fishery], and in 
addition to take steps to determine both the actual kill and the 
number of bowhead whales as well as the [present] status of this 
stock .... "53 During the following year the Committee again ex-
pressed "its continuing concern on lack of information on the status 
of this stock, on the reported high loss rate and on the increase in 
catch in the last two seasons."54 And, although noting in 1975 that 
a recently available report on the bowhead in Alaska included new 
data on Eskimo catches, the Committee continued to stress that 
"[t]he size of the stock and its present condition are still unknown 
and the Committee recommends to the Commission that steps be 
taken to obtain better biological data and also to minimize the loss 
rate with the aim of reducing total mortality. "55 
In 1976 the Scientific Committee once again expressed its concern 
over the bowhead problem, recommending "that [the] necessary 
steps be taken to limit the expansion of the fishery and to reduce 
the loss rate of struck whales (without increasing total take)."56 
Finally, the plenary session oflWC responded, recommending that 
member states take "all feasible steps" to reduce the waste and 
limit the expansion of aboriginal bowhead whaling.57 
In 1977 the Scientific Committee moved toward a total halt to 
aboriginal hunting of the bowhead. Considering recent statistics on 
the status of the stock58 and the environmental risks of oil develop-
53 1973 Scientific Committee Report, in TWENTY-FOURTH REpORT OF THE IWC 47, reprinted 
in NOAA Memo, supra note 51, at 1-2 and in 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 13. 
" 1974 Scientific Committee Report, in TwENTY-FIFTH REpORT OF THE IWC 72, reprinted in 
NOAA Memo, supra note 51, at 2 and in 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 14. 
55 1975 Reports and Papers of the Scientific Committee 13, reprinted in NOAA Memo, 
supra note 51, at 2 and in 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 14-15. 
51 1976 Scientific Committee Report, in TwENTY-SEVENTH REpORT OF THE IWC 45, reprinted 
in NOAA Memo, supra note 51, at 4 and in 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 16. 
" TwENTY-SEVENTH REPORT OF THE IWC 33, reprinted in NOAA Memo, supra note 51, at 4 
and in 1 FEIS supra note 3, at 17. 
The 1976 IWC schedule, under the New Management Procedure, classified the bowhead 
as a Protection Stock and then further provided, "the taking of gray or right whales by 
aborigines or a Contracting Government on behalf of aborigines is permitted but only when 
the meat and products of such whales are to be used exclusively for local consumption by 
the aborigines." [WC 1976 Schedule, para. 7, reprinted in 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 7. The 
term "right whales" in these provisions includes the bowhead. [WC 1976 Schedule, para. 
#1(1), reprinted in 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 7. 
" The Committee's action was based on an estimate of bowhead stock size of 600-1000 
whales with an upper limit of 1200-1600. It believed the initial size of the Bering Sea bowhead 
stock was between 11,700 and 18,000 whales. Relating these figures, the Committee noted that 
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ment in the Arctic,59 the Committee stated that on "biological 
grounds the exploitation of this species must cease . . . "60 and re-
commended to the full Commission that all aboriginal bowhead 
harvesting be stopped.80 On June 24, 1977, IWC voted to ban all 
aboriginal hunting of the bowhead. All members of IWC voted for 
the ban except for the United States, which abstained.62 
Under the rules of IWC, a member has ninety days after being 
officially notified of a Commission action to file an objection with 
the Commission. Once a member nation objects, that particular 
IWC action becomes ineffective for that member, and the other 
members have an additional ninety days to file further objections.83 
This rule thus gave the United States until October 24, 1977 to file 
an objection with IWC in order to render the June decision ineffec-
tive. However, a decision to object would have run counter to con-
siderable international pressure to work within the IWC structure; 
in fact, no objection had been filed by any member with the Com-
mission since 1973.84 
The decision whether the United States should file an objection 
was evaluated in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) pre-
pared by the Department of Commerce.8S On October 20,1977, the 
State Department, which has the final decision-making authority in 
such situations, stated its intention not to object.88 Immediately a 
suit was filed on behalf of the Eskimos seeking an order from the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia requiring 
the United States to object.87 
the present estimated bowhead stock was well below protection level, which begins at 54 
percent of initial stock size. NOAA Memo, supra note 51, at 5-6 . 
• 9 Id. at 5. See also note 43, supra . 
•• 1977 Scientific Committee Report, reprinted in NOAA Memo, supra note 51, at 4 and 
in 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 17. 
" 1977 Scientific Committee Report, reprinted in NOAA Memo, supra note 51, at 4-5 and 
in 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 17. 
" 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 19. 
" International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. V, para. 3, 62 
Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849 . 
.. See Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1977) . 
•• See generally 1 FEIS, supra note 3. "The proposed action under consideration is whether 
the United States should accept the International Whaling Commission's action to delete the 
native exemption for the killing of bowhead whales. The alternatives are to object or not 
object." 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 3 . 
.. 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 740 (1977). 
" Adams v. Vance, No. 77-1834 (D.D.C., Oct. 21, 1977). 
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IV. ADAMS V. VANCE 
In Adams v. Vance,88 the Alaskan Eskimos sought to require the 
United States to object to the IWC ban on bowhead whaling, basing 
their complaint on three grounds.8' First, the plaintiffs alleged that 
the EIS failed to identify and discuss alternative actions available 
to the United States, thereby violating the National Environmental 
Policy Act.70 Next, the Eskimos claimed that the decision not to 
object violated a fiduciary duty owed by the United States to the 
Eskimos. Finally, the complaint stated that the decision not to 
object violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act; 71 the plaintiffs 
alleged that the government failed to follow statutory procedures in 
eliminating the exemption for Alaskan natives from the moratorium 
imposed by the Act on the taking of marine mammals. The Eskimos 
requested a temporary restraining order (TRO), claiming its issu-
ance would not harm the United States since, after a proper decision 
had been made, the objection to the IWC action could be withdrawn 
if warranted. On the other hand, the complaint alleged irreparable 
harm to the plaintiffs if no objection were filed, since the IWC ban 
would deprive the Eskimos of "food, fuel, and materials necessary 
for survival in the Arctic."72 
The government offered several responses to the request for a 
TRO.73 First, it claimed that the decision not to object to the IWC 
action was a foreign affairs issue and therefore not subject to judicial 
review. Next, the government maintained that plaintiff's motion for 
a TRO was in fact a petition for mandamus to perform a discretion-
ary act and thus could not be granted. Third, the answer alleged 
that the plaintiffs had not met the tests for a TRO. (a) The United 
States claimed that no irreparable harm would come to the Eski-
mos. Since the United States intended to ask IWC in the December 
1977 meeting to "allow a well managed whale hunt, based on a 
program developed cooperatively between the Alaskan natives and 
.. 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1977) . 
.. An excellent discussion of the Adams case may be found in Mason, supra note 44. 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4367 (1976). NEPA and the case law that has followed it lays out the 
requirements for an EIS. See Taylor, NEPA Pre-Emption Legislation: Decisionmaking Alter-
natives for Crucial Federal Projects, 6 ENV. AFF. 373 (1978). 
71 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976). 
72 Complaint at 7, Adams v. Vance, No. 77-1834 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 21, 1977). 
73 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Adams v. 
Vance, No. 77-1834 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 21, 1977). 
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the Government,"74 and since the next whaling season did not begin 
until the spring of 1978, it was alleged that sufficient time existed 
for plaintiffs to seek judicial relief if IWC rejected the American 
proposal. (b) The United States also claimed that an objection 
would cause substantial injury to its international conservation ef-
forts because the Commission could break down if other nations also 
began to file objections to IWC actions which adversely affected 
them. (c) The government argued also that the public interest lay 
on the side of a viable IWC. (d) Finally, the government asserted 
that there was little likelihood that the Eskimos would prevail on 
the merits of the case since the question involved was nonjusticia-
ble: the United States owed no duty to assure aboriginal hunting of 
an endangered marine mammal and the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act states that its provisions are to apply only "in addition to 
and not in contravention of' existing treaties.75 
On October 21, 1977, District Judge John Sirica ordered the Sec-
retary of State to object to the IWC ban on bowhead whaling.78 The 
court asserted that the Eskimos would not be able to "meaningfully 
present their claims" if an objection were not filed and that 
"defendants will suffer no substantial harm through the issuance of 
a temporary restraining order."77 
The government moved for summary reversal in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.78 Its motion 
was granted on October 24, 1977.78 The appeals court accepted the 
argument pressed by the government that the relief granted by the 
District Court was in effect a mandatory injunction and thus ap-
pealable.80 The court did not address the justiciability issue but said 
that the foreign policy aspects of the case were such as to require 
that the Eskimos make an "extraordinarily strong showing to suc-
ceed."81 Plaintiffs failed in this respect, the court finding that the 
" [d. at 7. 
" [d. at 15, citing 16 U.S.C. § 1383 (1976). 
" Temporary Restraining Order, Adams v. Vance, No. 77-1834 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1977). 
77 [d. 
78 Motion for Summary Reversal, Adams v. Vance, No. 77-1960 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 23, 
1977). 
79 Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
'" A temporary restraining order issued under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) is generally not appeala-
ble, while a mandatory injunction can be appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)(1976). See 
Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Mason, supra note 44, at 375 
n.80. 
" Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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United States would suffer severe injury in filing an objection with 
IWC, while the Eskimos would not suffer harm of sufficient magni-
tude to force an objection, On the same day as this decision, Justice 
Burger, as Circuit Justice, denied plaintiff's application for a stay 
of the order of the Court of Appeals.82 
Following its victory in court, the United States proposed at the 
December meeting of IWC that the Eskimos be allowed a bowhead 
quota of fifteen whales landed or thirty whales struck.83 Whaling 
methods would be supervised to limit waste84 and an extensive re-
search program conducted.85 The American proposal seemed reason-
able, especially in light of a study by the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare which concluded that the nine Eskimo 
whaling villages needed twenty-four average size whales to satisfy 
a significant portion of their basic protein needs. 88 On the other 
hand, the Scientific Committee of IWC was still committed to a 
moratorium on bowhead harvesting and reiterated its position "that 
taking of any bowhead whales could adversely affect the stock and 
contribute to preventing its eventual recovery, if in fact such recov-
ery is still possible."87 However, the Committee did recognize "that 
the Commission may wish to discuss other considerations (subsist-
ence and cultural needs, etc.). These are beyond the expertise of the 
Scientific Committee."88 Ultimately, IWC adopted a compromise 
position whereby it set a quota of twelve whales landed or eighteen 
whales struck.89 
After the Commission's decision the United States had to give the 
quota domestic effect. Two possible avenues were available: either 
the government could regulate Eskimo whaling using the Marine 
82 Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1977), application for stay denied by Burger, 
Circuit Justice, 1977. See letter from Michael Rodak, Jr. to J. Keith Dysart, Oct. 25, 1977. 
83 Under such a quota whaling would stop whenever one of those numbers was reached. 
Mason, supra note 44, at 381. Of course, "landed" whales are also considered as having been 
"struck" so Eskimo hunters could not strike and lose 30 whales and land 15 more . 
.. For example, the use of a shoulder gun would not be allowed before a whale had been 
harpooned. [d. at 381 n.l07 . 
.. [d. at 381. 
.. [d. 
87 [d., quoting REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMri'TEE SPECIAL MEETING: NORTH PACIFIC SPERM 
WHALE ASSESSMENTS 28 (Nov. 21-26, 1977) . 
.. Mason, supra note 44, at 382, quoting REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE SPECIAL 
MEETING: NORTH PACIFIC SPERM WHALE ASSESSMENTS 28 (Nov. 21-26, 1977) . 
.. Eleven nations supported this quota. Australia, Canada and the Netherlands opposed 
the change to allow limited hunting, while Brazil and Panama were not represented. Mason, 
supra note 44, at 382. 
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Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA),90 or it could implement 
the quota as it did any other IWC action using the Whaling Conven-
tion Act of 1949.91 MMPA allows Eskimos to hunt marine mammals 
for certain purposes despite the national moratorium which the Act J 
generally imposes on such hunting. Section 101lb)92 of the Act does, ! 
however, provide that the Depar!:r~~ent of Commerce may designate \ 
a certain\vliale-speClesas'(dej)leted'1md thereafter issue regula- I tio~"Sto'coiifior OrprohiOit the- hu'iiHng. of. that "d~pJ~t~<!'.',,~p~fies I 
bx.A!askl!~~; such regulations can become effective only after 
a p~~rin~ ~Ws.f§~.93 On the other hand, regulations promul-
gated by the Department of Commerce under the Whaling convenJ 
tion Act pursuant to an IWC action become effective immediately 
upon publication in the Federal Register; no hearing process is re-
quired.94 
Less than a month before the December 1977 IWC meeting, the 
Department of Commerce had, pursuant to its authority under 
MMPA, designated the bowhead as a "depleted" species and pro-
posed regulations to limit the Eskimo hunt to fifteen bowheads 
landed or thirty struck, the same level suggested by the United 
States at the December IWC meeting.9s On January 30, 1978, after 
IWC passed the compromise quota of twelve landed and eighteen 
struck, the proposed regulations were withdrawn as being "not ap-
propriate".98 The government then chose to implement the compro-
mise quota as it would any other IWC action. Consequently, the 
Department of Commerce, pursuant to its authority under the 
Whaling Convention Act, issued regulations implementing the com-
promise quota passed by IWC. 97 These regulations were subse-
'0 16 U,S,C, §§ 1361-1407 (1976). 
" 16 U.S.C. §§ 916(a)-916(l)(1976), 
" 16 U.S,C, § 1371(b)(1976), 
03 Id. 
" 16 U,S,C, § 916(k)(1976), 
" The bowhead was designated as a "depleted" species in 42 Fed, Reg, 60,149 (1977) and 
the proposed regulations may be found in 42 Fed, Reg, 60,185 (1977), 
.. 43 Fed. Reg. 3921 (1978), 
" The 1978 IWC Schedule was published on March 8, 1978; proposed regulations for subs-
istence hunting of bowheads were published under the Whaling Convention Act on March 6, 
1978 and put out in final form on April 3, 1978, Under these regulations each village was 
allocated a portion of the total 12/18 quota, The 1978 IWC Schedule may be found in 43 Fed. 
Reg. 9481 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 351). The proposed regulations on bowhead 
hunting may be found in 43 Fed. Reg. 9172 (1978), while the final form of the regulations 
appear in 43 Fed, Reg. 13,883 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C,F.R. § 230), Proposed regulations 
implementing the 1979 management program distributing the 1979 quota of 18 landed/27 
struck may be found in 44 Fed, Reg. 5916 (1979), 
~ .'~ f41// r~ 
'/ 
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quently amended twice.'s 
V. HOPSON V. KREPS 
The Eskimos did not acquiesce to the IWC quotas, but filed a 
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of 
Alaska requesting that the regulations promulgated under the 
Whaling Convention Act99 be declared void. This suit, Hopson v. 
Kreps, 100 was brought on behalf of "the approximately 4,500 Eski-
mos who are dependent on Bowhead whale hunting to obtain food, 
fuel, materials, and cultural and social fulfillments."lol The com-
plaint focuses primarily on the inadequate amount of whale meat 
available in the whaling villages as a result of observance of the 
quotas102 and the consequent physical, social and psychological dis-
ruptions. 
The Hopson complaint offers three grounds for invalidating the 
Whaling Convention Act regulations. First, it asserts that neither 
the 1946 whaling agreement nor the Whaling Convention Act au-
thorizes the regulation of aboriginal whaling. Next, the plaintiffs 
claim that the regulations violate the government's trust responsi-
bility to the Eskimos. Finally, the Eskimos argue that the regula-
tions were promulgated in violation of the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 1972 (MMPA)103 and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(ESA),104 statutes which allegedly pre-empt any authority to regu-
.. An amendment permitting the redistribution of any unused quota from one village to 
another was added on May 24, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 22,213 (1978) (amending 50 C.F.R. § 
230.74). The regulations were amended once again on September 22,1978.43 Fed. Reg. 43,025 
(1978) (amending 50 C.F.R. § 230.74). The proposed version of these amendments may be 
found in 43 Fed. Reg. 38,609 (1978). 
There were two reasons for the September change: first, due to an Eskimo effort to abide 
by the quota and to work within IWC for a more liberal quota, only 10 landings and 15 strikes 
were made during the spring hunting season. The remaining two landings/three strikes had 
to be allocated to the three villages that hunt bowheads in the fall. Second, in June 1978, 
IWC increased the 1978 bowhead quota to 14 landed/20 struck and established a quota of 18 
landed/27 struck for 1979. The regulations were thus updated to distribute a quota of four 
landed (two left over from the spring, two as a result of the June increase) and five struck 
(three left from the spring, two added in June) between the fall whaling villages. The IWC 
Schedule, as codified in 50 C.F.R. § 351, was also amended to show the changes voted in June, 
1978, for the 1978 Schedule. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,309 (1978). 
" See notes 97 and 98, supra. 
100 No. A78·184 (D. Alaska, filed Aug. 8, 1978). 
,., Amended complaint at 5, Hopson v. Kreps, No. A78-184 (D. Alaska, filed Aug. 8, 1978). 
,.2 See note 98, supra. 
'.3 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976). 
I •• 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). 
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late aboriginal whaling under the Whaling Convention Act. 
Both parties moved for partial summary judgmentl05 on the ques-
tion of whether the 1946 whaling agreement and the Whaling Con-
vention Act authorize the regulation of Eskimo whaling. In January 
1979, the court on its own motion dismissed the action in its en-
tirety,108 holding that "the regulations promulgated to enforce the 
Schedule of the International Whaling Commission are so directly 
linked to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations that this court lacks 
the subject matter jurisdiction to review their validity."107 Hopson 
is now on appeal.t08 
The Hopson complaint raises many fascinating questions with 
respect to the jurisdiction of IWC, the relationship of the Whaling 
Convention Act to both MMPA and ESA and the scope of the 
federal trust responsibility to the Eskimos. While the issue of 
whether the matter is a "political question" has raised a jurisdic-
tional bar to a court decision on any of these questions, it is interest-
ing to speculate about the proper resolution of the case on its merits. 
The balancing of interests that must be undertaken when deciding 
what levels of Eskimo whaling may be allowed must include a con-
sideration of any federal trust responsibility to the Eskimo people. 
In addition, if trust duties are found to exist the United States will 
be in a precarious position if the future efficacy of IWC depends 
upon a breach of its responsibilities to the Alaskan Eskimos. The 
trust issue is thus an important dimension of the entire bowhead 
problem. While a resolution of any trust questions may not dictate 
what the United States should do about regulating Eskimo whaling, 
the scope of federal fiduciary duties to the Eskimo can eliminate 
those options which are not available to the federal government. lOB 
1,5 Partial summary judgment is simply summary judgment on one issue in a case involving 
multiple issues. See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 119 (1972). 
I.' Hopson v. Kreps, 462 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Alaska 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79·4151 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 16, 1979). 
107 [d. at 1383. 
10' No arguments have yet been heard by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
10. This article focuses on the trust responsibility of the United States to the Eskimos; the 
questions of the jurisdiction of IWC and the relationship of the Whaling Convention Act to 
MMPA and ESA are beyond its scope. 
Another case raising the trust issue is People of Togiak v. United States, recently decided 
by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. No. 77-0264 (D.D.C. filed 
Feb. 11, 1977). Togiak centers on Section 109 of MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (1976), which pre-
empts state laws and regulations relating to the taking of marine mammals. The section 
provides, however, that state laws and regulations concerning the conservation of marine 
mammals may be reinstated if consistent with MMPA. The MMPA moratorium on the 
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VI. THE GENERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES 
TOWARDS NATIVE CULTURES 
The plaintiffs in the Adams and Hopson cases alleged, inter alia, 
that the federal government violated a special relationship existing 
between the United States and the Eskimos when it moved to regu-
late hunting of the bowhead whale in response to the action of IWC. 
Any discussion concerning the existence of such a relationship be-
tween the United States and the Inupiat Eskimos must, however, 
first examine the general pattern of treatment of native cultures by 
the United States. A fiduciary relationship has long been recognized 
between Indian tribes of the lower forty-eight states and the federal 
government. While many aspects of Indian law admittedly do not 
apply to Eskimos because of historical and ethnological distinctions 
between Indians and Eskimos, it is nonetheless logical to assume 
that aspects of the basic fiduciary relationship established for the 
benefit of Indian tribes extend to Eskimo villages. IIO 
Over the years three lines of cases have dealt with different as-
pects of the relationship between the United States and the Indian 
tribes. The first line of cases, written by Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, lays the basis of the government's fiduciary relationship to-
taking of marine mammals has been waived for only one animal, the Pacific Walrus 
(Odobenus rosmarus) and state laws and regulations relating to the walrus have been ap-
proved for only one state, Alaska. The waiver resulted in a federal regulation providing that 
all hunting of the walrus must be in accordance with Alaska state law and regulations. 
Following this federal action, Alaska moved to regulate native hunting of walruses. In Togiak, 
the plaintiffs argued in a class action that the freedom to hunt marine mammals granted in 
MMPA cannot be restricted by allowing the re-institution of state conservation laws. They 
alleged that Congress pre-empted any state regulation of native hunting of marine mammals 
by providing a native exemption in MMPA, and that this exemption can only be narrowed 
according to the terms of Section 101(b) of the Act, id. § 1371(b), which allows regulation of 
native hunting in case a species has been designated "depleted." The plaintiffs supported 
their argument by asserting that the federal government has a trust obligation to Alaskan 
natives and, "by administratively terminating the statutory exemption for Natives and sur-
rendering power to control Native hunting to the state, defendants have violated ... their 
duty to act as trustee for Alaskan Natives, and violated the Supremacy and Due Process 
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution." Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss at 3, People of Togiak v. United States, No. 77-0264 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 11, 1977).lt 
is this trust aspect of Togiak that makes the case a potential vehicle for judicial analysis of 
the federal trust responsibility to Alaskan natives. The case is also important in determining 
the ways in which the MMPA exemption for Alaskan natives can be restricted. On April 3, 
1979, the district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding the MMPA exemp-
tion does in fact pre-empt the regulation of aboriginal walrus hunting by the state of Alaska. 
[1979) 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2367. 
liD See text at notes 136-76, infra. 
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ward the Indian tribes. The second set of cases deals with the powers 
of Congress in Indian affairs. The third line of cases concerns the 
duties owed by the executive branch to the Indians. Over the years 
this entire body of case law has repeatedly described the tie between 
the federal government and the Indians as "resembling" a guardian-
ship, a guardian-ward relationship, a fiduciary relationship and a 
trust responsibility. 1 11 
A. Marshall's Decisions 
Two opmIOns of the Supreme Court, Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia 112 and Worcester v. Georgia, 113 were written by Chief Justice 
Marshall in the early 1830's and establish the basis for the trust 
responsibility. The Court in Cherokee Nation found that Indian 
tribes were not "foreign states" in the context of Article III of the 
United States Constitution: 
[The Indian tribes] may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated 
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert 
a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of 
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in 
a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that 
of a ward to his guardian. 
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness 
and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the 
President as their great father. They and their country are considered 
by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under 
the sovereignity and dominion of the United States, that any attempt 
to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them would 
be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostil-
ity.ll( 
Although Justice Marshall did use the wardship label, his opinion 
can be interpreted as an assertion of some degree of tribal sover-
eignty. Marshall said that Indian tribes resembled wards of the 
III Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1213-14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Chambers1. In this article, Chambers 
presents an excellent overview of how the trust responsibility has evolved and where it stands 
today. The conceptual framework he sets out is the basis for the present analysis. The 
guardian-ward relationship is a judicial creature having its basis in early Supreme Court 
decisions which also emphasized a certain sovereignty retained by the Indian tribes. See text 
at notes 112-18, infra. 
112 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
113 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
I" Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). 
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United States, but did not assert that individual Indians actually 
were wards of the federal government.1I5 Over the years, however, 
Marshall's views have been interpreted as a source of federal power 
over the Indian tribes. Perhaps the true basis for the decision lies 
in an attempt to place Indian land within the American land system 
of the 1830's. In the words of one recent commentator: 
A treaty was in essence a land transaction whereby the tribe ceded 
some lands in return for federal protection and sovereign recognition of 
Indian occupancy of the retained lands. By concluding treaties with and 
submitting to the protection of the United States, the tribe acknowl-
edged that it was a sort of federal vassal or loyal subject. A guardian-
ward relationship can thus be seen as a natural incident of such land 
tenure; since Indians were not citizens, the guardianship concept pro-
vided a way in which their ownership of real property could be acknowl-
edged and protected. III 
The next time the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the trust 
relationship,1I7 over fifty years had passed and the geography of the 
United States had changed radically. Marshall's views then were 
interpreted as a source of federal authority over Indian affairs, not 
merely over their rights to the land. Not surprisingly, the case law 
of this period confirmed the use of federal power, primarily congres-
sional power, even sanctioning the authority to abrogate treaty 
rights. liS 
B. Congressional Power in Indian Affairs 
In United States v. Kagama,1I9 the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the Major Crimes Act120 and applied federal criminal law to 
certain crimes committed by Indians against Indians in Indian 
country. The fiduciary relationship was a central basis for the hold-
ing: 
"' Finnigan, Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Fishing Rights: A Case Study, 
51 WASH. L. REv. 61, 72 (1975). 
I" Chambers, supra note 111, at 1219. 
1\7 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
1\8 Chambers, supra note 111, at 1223. It should be noted that "the power of Congress to 
enact legislation in conflict with treaties is well established in the field of foreign affairs, as 
well as in the field oflndian affairs." F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 34 (1971). 
II. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
120 Act of March 3,1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 
(1976». 
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These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation .... Because of the 
local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often 
their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so 
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with 
them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the 
duty of protection, and with it the power.121 
In another Supreme Court decision members of the Kiowa and 
Comanche tribes attempted to halt the enforcement of a statute 
which allotted tribally-owned reservation land to individual tribe 
members and which authorized the sale of reservation lands left 
unallotted. The suit, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,122 was based on an 
1867 treaty expressly prohibiting cession of reservation land without 
tribal consent. 123 Citing a "plenary" power held by Congress over 
Indian property, the Court upheld the statute, saying that the 
treaty could not "materially limit and qualify the controlling au-
thority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the 
Indians, and ... deprive Congress, in a possible emergency ... , 
of all power to act, if the assent of the Indians could not be ob-
tained. "124 The Court viewed the congressional power to abrogate 
the 1867 treaty as political, and "not subject to be controlled by the 
judicial department of the government. "125 The Court assumed a 
somewhat paternalistic attitude, presuming that treaties may be 
abrogated "in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves 
•••• "128 and concluded that any injury resulting from congres-
sional abrogation could only be remedied by an appeal to Con-
gress. 127 
The holdings of Kagama and Lone Wolf remain basically un-
changed today. The trust responsibility of Congress towards the 
Indians is viewed as being based on a moral obligation and generally 
there are no enforceable standards for the courts to use when scruti-
nizing a congressional action relating to Indians. A recent case, 128 
however, suggests that Congress' seemingly plenary powers are not 
absolute. Descendants of a group of Delaware Indians, who had 
'21 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (emphasis in the original). 
122 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
123 Medicine Lodge Treaty, Oct. 21, 1867, United States-Kiowa and Comanche Tribes, 15 
Stat. 581. 
'24 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903). 
125 [d. at 565. 
'26 [d. at 566. 
127 [d. at 568. 
128 Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). 
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become American citizens and dissolved their relationship with 
their tribe under an 1866 treaty, challenged the congressional distri-
bution scheme for the payment of funds to two Delaware Indian 
tribes as compensation for the government's breach of an 1854 
treaty. The plaintiffs alleged that their exclusion from the distribu-
tion plan violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 129 
The Supreme Court upheld the congressional plan. However, the 
Court did state in dictum that not all federal legislation concerning 
Indians is necessarily immune from judicial scrutiny: 
The statement in Lone Wolf . .. that the power of Congress 'has 
always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the 
judicial department of the government,' however pertinent to the ques-
tion then before the Court of congressonal power to abrogate treaties 
... has not deterred this court, particularly in this day, from scrutiniz-
ing Indian legislation to determine whether it violates the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment,13° 
C. The Duty of the Executive Branch 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized a broad congres-
sional power in Indian affairs, it has nonetheless imposed tight lim-
its on the power of executive officials in their dealings with Indians, 
recognizing "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the 
Government [i.e. executive officials] in its dealings with these de-
pendent and sometimes exploited people."13! The Court has stated 
that "the acts of those who represent the United States in dealings 
with the Indians should ... be judged by the most exacting fidu-
ciary standards."!32 
Examples of what these "exacting fiduciary standards" entail 
129 u.s. CONST. amend. V. 
130 Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 89 (1977). For a more detailed 
discussion of congressional power in Indian affairs, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 91-100 (1971). 
131 Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942). 
132 [d. at 297. Seminole was preceded by three cases which explicitly extended a trust 
obligation to federal officials. In 1919, the Interior Department was enjoined from disposing 
of tribal lands under the general public land laws in the case of Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 
249 U.S. 110 (1919). The Court stated that the plenary congressional power outlined in Lone 
Wolf "[ c lertainly . . . would not justify . . . treating the lands of [the j Indians . . . as 
public lands of the United States and disposing of the same under the public land laws." Such 
a move "would not be an exercise of the guardianship, but an act of confiscation." Id. at 113. 
Two later cases, Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923), and United States v. Creek 
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935), similarly protected Indian land rights from executive encroach-
ment. 
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have been set out in case law. In general, the courts impose two 
distinct obligations on officials of federal agencies/Flrifi courts in-
terpret statutes in the Indians' favor. Unlike the Congress, the exec-
utive branch has no independent moral obligation to the Indian 
tribes. Insteaa, the executive must strictly follow the judicial ver-
sion of standards set by Congress,133 with the general rule being 
"that statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or 
communities are to be liberally constru~ji, doubtful expressions 
being resolved in favor of the Indians. "13\Second) courts often hold 
federal officials to their trust obligations 8:s-dgrned by traditional 
trust standards, finding a "duty in administering the trust to exer-
cise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exer-
cise in dealing with his own property. "135 
133 See Chambers, supra note 111, at 1231-32. 
134 Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). See also Antoine v. 
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975). The Supreme Court has not undertaken a thorough 
analysis of the trust responsibility and its various facets, 80 it is often helpful to look to lower 
federal courts for further explanation of trust issues. For example, in an opinion involving a 
dispute over the enforceability of a county zoning ordinance and building code on Indian 
reservation lands, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated: 
This principle [that ambiguities in treaties or statutes dealing with Indians must be 
resolved favorably to the Indians] is somewhat more than a canon of construction akin 
to Latin maxim, easily invoked and as easily disregarded. It is an interpretative device, 
early framed by John Marshall's legal conscience for ensuring the discharge of the nation's 
obligations to the conquered Indian tribes. The Federal government has long been recog-
nized to hold, along with its plenary power to regulate Indian affairs, a trust status towards 
the Indian-a status accompanied by fiduciary obligations. . . . While there is legally 
nothing to prevent Congress from disregarding its trust obligations and abrogating treaties 
or passing laws inimical to the Indians' welfare, the courts, by interpreting ambiguous 
statutes in favor of Indians, attribute to Congress an intent to exercise its plenary power 
in the manner most consistent with the nation's trust obligations. 
Santa Rosa Band v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975). 
This is not to imply that Indians prevail in every court action they file because of the trust 
responsibility. In a case bearing some similarity to the whole bowhead issue, the Supreme 
Court held that state powers to pass and enforce wildlife conservation laws overrode certain 
Indian hunting and fishing rights as guaranteed by treaty. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of 
Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977). Discussion of the lengthy litigation leading to this decision may 
be found in Dein, State Jurisdiction and On-Reservation Affairs: Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of 
Game, 6 ENV. AFF. 535 (1978). 
135 United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973), citing 2 A. SCOTI', TRUSTS § 1408 (3d 
ed. 1967). 
Two lower federal courts have followed this Supreme Court lead. In one case, an Indian 
band sought damages for the alleged failure of federal officials to properly administer funds 
held in trust for the band. The district court stated that it was "unquestioned that the United 
States has a solemn trust obligation to the Indian people." Manchester Band of Porno Indi-
ans, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Further, the trust 
relationship was to be measured "by the same standards applicable to private trustees." Id. 
at 1245. The Court of Claims, in Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639 
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In summary, the three lines of case law interpreting the trust 
responsibility owed to the Indians by the United States present 
three important points. First, some kind of special relationship ex-
ists between the United States and the Indian tribes. Whether de-
scribed as a wardship, trusteeship or guardianship, there necessarily 
results some fiduciary obligation assumed by the United States. 
Second, Congress is the body that determines the scope and purpose 
of the trust relationship. Few, if any, constitutional guidelines exist 
for this congressional determination. Third, executive officials must 
strictly comply with any trust terms. Such compliance is gauged 
both by close executive adherence to congressional mandates and by 
resort to private trust concepts. 
VII. THE TRUST RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ESKIMOS 
Major impediments exist to the wholesale application of tradi-
tional trust theory to Alaskan natives due to the differences between 
Indian and Eskimo history. First, the 1867 treaty transferring 
Alaska from Russian to American sovereignty136 made no distinction 
between native Alaskan and non-native Alaskan. However, the 
treaty did distinguish between "civilized tribes" and "uncivilized 
tribes," the former being treated as United States citizens while the 
latter were to be treated in the same manner as other aboriginal 
tribes within the United States (that is, like the Indian tribes) .137 
Second, no westward migration of white civilization displaced the 
Alaskan natives as it did the Indian tribes. In fact, Congress created 
(Ct. CI. 1977), found that federal officials had breached their fiduciary duty when they sold 
a right-of-way across an Indian reservation for about 5 percent of fair market value. The court 
stated that" [t lhe United States, when acting as trustee for the property of its Indian wards, 
is held to the most exacting fiduciary standards" and judged federal behavior by private 
trustee standards. Id. at 652-53. 
'38 Treaty of Cession, March 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539. 
137 Article III of the treaty provided: 
The inhabitants of the ceded territory, according to their choice, reserving their natural 
allegiance, may return to Russia within three years; but if they should prefer to remain 
in the ceded territory, they, with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be 
admitted to the enjoyment of all rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the 
United States, and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their 
liberty, property, and religion. The uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and 
regulations as the United States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to the aboriginal 
tribes of that country. 
Treaty of Cession, March 30, 1867, United States-Russia, art. III, 15 Stat. 539. For a discus-
sion of the distinction between the "civilized" and "uncivilized" tribes, see In re Minook, 2 
Alaska 200 (1904). 
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only one reservation in Alaska,138 so that the vast majority of natives 
never experienced reservation life. Third, Eskimo culture centers 
around the village rather than the tribe, an important ethnological 
distinction from the Indians. 139 Fourth, the United States never con-
cluded any treaties with Alaskan natives. 140 Thus, no specific agree-
ment exists which could form the basis of any trust relationship 
between the Eskimos and the United States. Finally, traditional 
trust theory as applied to Indians dealt mostly with land rights and 
the administration of property in general. Little precedent exists for 
applying that theory to non-property concepts, such as cultural sur-
vival and environmental matters. 141 The presence of all these factors 
therefore makes the application of trust theory to the Eskimos by 
no means automatic. 
HO~lTtwe other factors militate in favor of applying the trust 
responsibility of the United States toward native peoples to the 
Eskimos of northern Alaska. First, some aspects of the fiduciary 
138 See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1015 (D. Alaska 1977). 
13' See Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 155 n.12 (Alaska 1977), citing F. COHEN, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 405 (1942). 
14' The government had only four years within which to conclude treaties with Alaskan 
natives, for the Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (current version at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 71 (1976)), prohibited the use of treaties in dealing with the Indian tribes. Apparently no 
attempt at drawing up treaties with Alaskan natives was ever made. See Atkinson v. Hal-
dane, 569 P.2d 151, 154 (Alaska 1977). 
14' One case which does suggest that the trust relationship extends to non-property con-
cepts is Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973). Here a federal 
district court enjoined a land reclamation project which had the effect of diverting water from 
an Indian reservation downstream. The diversion violated no statute or treaty. The court 
stated that the Secretary of the Interior had to justify diversions of water from the reservation 
and found that there was no showing that the fiduciary obligation to the tribe had been 
considered by Interior. Id. at 256-57. This case could be read as saying that federal projects 
must avoid interfering with the federal trust responsibility to the Indians. Chambers, supra 
note 111, at 1234. Such a reading would extend the trust relationship to include such intangi-
bles as general Indian welfare and perhaps cultural survival, as well as land and money. 
But see Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1973), in which it was found that 
the trust responsibility does not require the affirmative exercise of discretionary powers. The 
court held that failure of the Interior and Agriculture Departments to set aside lands in the 
Klamath National Forest for the plaintiffs and the Karuk tribe did not violate the federal 
trust responsibility. In distinguishing other cases ordering federal action in accordance with 
the trust responsibility, the court said: 
All these cases have invoked or at least referred to the trust responsibility doctrine in the 
contest of particular, recognized Indian rights, which were being interfered with or not 
sufficiently protected .... In the pending case we find no comparable contest of particu-
lar, recognizable rights of plaintiffs upon which to invoke the doctrine of trust responsibil-
ity. 
Id. at 1324. 
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relationship that exists between the United States and the Indians 
likely extend to Alaskan natives as well. Both Indians and Eskimos 
are included in the more modern "Native American" term which 
appears to denote a group of people to which the United States has 
a certain responsibility.142 Like the Indians, Eskimos are apt to suf-
fer as the encroachment of the American version of civilization con-
tinues. If the trust relationship is to encompass any element of 
culturakl?rotection, it logically must extend to Alaskan natives. 
A seconl;l basis for extending federal fiduciary obligations to the 
EskiinQ!tJiks in the long history of relations between the United 
States government and the Alaskan natives. By its actions, the 
United States has essentially recognized the existence of such a 
trust responsibility. President Theodore Roosevelt articulated this 
governmental concern for the Eskimos in 1904, demonstrating his 
sensitivity to the predicament in which many Alaskan natives found 
themselves: 
The Alaskan natives are kindly, intelligent, anxious to learn and will-
ing to work. Those who have come under the influence of civilization, 
even for a limited period, have proved their capability of becoming self-
supporting, self-respecting citizens, and ask only for the just enforce-
ment of law and intelligent instruction and supervision. Others living 
in more remote regions, primitive, simple hunters and fisher folk, who 
know only the life of the woods and the waters, are daily being con-
fronted with twentieth-century civilization with all of its complexities. 
Their country is being overrun by strangers, the game slaughtered and 
driven away, the streams depleted of fish, and hitherto unknown and 
fatal diseases brought to them, all of which combine to produce a state 
of abject poverty and want which must result in their extinction. Action 
in their interest is demanded by every consideration of justice and hu-
manity.143 
These words of President Roosevelt were supported by several 
laws then in effect which, at least on their face, provided some 
degree of protection to Alaskan natives. The Treaty of Cession 144 
provided that "uncivilized" tribes would be subject to "such laws 
and regulations as the United States may . . . adopt in regard to 
142 For example, the purpose of the Native American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2991-2992d (Supp. v 1975), "is to promote the goal of economic and social self-sufficiency 
for American Indians, Hawaiian Natives and Alaskan Natives." Id. § 2991a (1976). 
1<3 President Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 6, 1904, 
reprinted in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7024, 7050 (1911). 
14. Treaty of Cession, March 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539. 
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aboriginal tribes of that country."145 An 1884 statute extended fed-
eral mining laws to Alaska with the exception "[tJhat the Indians 
or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed in the posses-
sion of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed 
by them but the terms under which such persons may acquire title 
to such lands is reserved for future legislation by Congress .... "146 
The Homestead Act was extended to Alaska in 1898 with the provi-
sion "[ t] ha t the secretary of the interior shall reserve for the use 
of the natives of Alaska suitable tracts of land along the water front 
of any stream, inlet, bay or sea shore for landing places for canoes 
and other craft used by such natives."147 In 1900, the legislation 
providing for a detailed structure of civil government in Alaska 
stated that "[t]he Indians or persons conducting schools .or mis-
sions in the district shall not be disturbed in the possession of any 
lands now actually in their use or occupation .... "14X 
Over the years courts have interpreted these statutes as demon-
strating some congressional concern for the welfare of Alaskan na-
tives. For example, as one court stated in 1902: 
The prohibition contained in the act of 1884 against the disturbance of 
the use or possession of any Indian or other person of any land in Alaska 
claimed by them is sufficiently general and comprehensive to include 
tide lands as well as lands above the high-water mark. Nor is it surpris-
ing that congress, in first dealing with the then sparsely settled country, 
was disposed to protect its few inhabitants in the possession of lands, 
of whatever character, by means of which they eked out their hard and 
precarious existence. 149 
Moreover, in 1942 the Interior Department concluded that any regu-
lations purporting to permit control by non-Indians of areas in 
Alaska that may be shown to have been subject to aboriginal occu-
pancy would be unauthorized and illegal. I50 
In Tee-Hit- Ton Indians u. United States,151 the Supreme Court 
confirmed congressional authority in Eskimo affairs by extending to 
such matters the Kagama-Lone Wolf principle that Congress pos-
'" See note 137, supra. 
'" Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat. 24, 26. 
", Act of May 14, 1898, ch. 299, § 10, 30 Stat. 409, 413 . 
• " Act of June 6,1900, ch. 786, § 27, 31 Stat. 321, 330 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 280(a) 
(1976». 
'" Heckman v. Sutter, 119 F. 83, 88 (9th Cir. 1902). 
150 Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Alaska, 57 INTERIOR DEC. 461 (1942). 
15. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
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sesses plenary power in all Indian matters.152 The Tee-Hit-Tons, a 
Tlingit Indian clan living in southeastern Alaska, alleged that they 
had an aboriginal claim to lands within the Tongass National Forest 
and to all timber harvested on the land. Citing the 1884 and 1900 
statutesl53 as a basis for recovery, the Tee-Hit-Tons sued for the 
value of the timber harvested. The government responded by citing 
a 1947 Congressional resolution which provided that "the Secretary 
of Agriculture ... [may sell] timber growing on any vacant, unap-
propriated and unpatented lands within the exterior boundaries of 
the Tongass National Forest in Alaska, notwithstanding any claim 
of possessory rights."154 In its decision, the Court rejected the Alas-
kan native claim, finding that the 1884 and 1900 statutes granted 
no permanent land rights, but merely granted permissive occupa-
tion-a right to a preserved status quo until further congressional 
or judicial action was taken. 155 Such a right of occupancy served 
only to protect against intrusion by third parties and could be con-
stitutionally terminated by the sovereign without compensation to 
the natives. 158 Thus,. the CQurt, consiateJl.t..~_ih~ __ l£qgQmq-Lone 
WQ1Lwi~~~.e.~!l~~~~J.b~, .. tight~_J1f...natU:~J~¥_~~~.~!~~~§Ional 
action al\l~ n~by .l>!<>"B:~ctJ!?-~~~rpretatiQ!!§_~~~!!~~~~Il­
ship, thereoy reinforcing the plenary power of Congress to control 
tlii s~()peofTeae~J~~~l ()EI!~iEfu~; 'Tee":Hif:"TOn'relegated'i1llti ve 
rights to'mere"figlits to undisturbed use and occupancy, capable of 
being extinguished or expanded only through Congressional ac-
tion. 15s 
152 See text at notes 119-27, supra. 
153 See text at notes 146 and 148, supra. 
'54 Joint Resolution of August 8, 1947, ch. 516, § 2(a), 61 Stat. 920, 921. "Possessory rights" 
were defined as: 
all rights, if any should exist, which are based upon aboriginal occupancy or title, or upon 
section 8 of the Act of May 17, 1884 (23 Stat. 24), section 14 of the Act of March 3, 1891 
(26 Stat. 1095), or section 27 of the Act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat. 321), whether claimed 
by native tribes, native villages, native individuals, or other persons, and which have not 
been confirmed by patent or court decision or included in any reservation. 
Id., 61 Stat. at 920-21. 
155 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1955). 
15. "Indian occupation of land without government recognition of ownership creates no 
rights against taking or extinction by the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment 
or any other principle of law." Id. at 285. 
157 See text at notes 119-27, supra. 
15M See Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1373 (D.D.C. 1973). 
Tee-Hit-Ton is to be distinguished from cases involving Indian land issues in the lower 48 
states in which treaty interpretation is most important. Whether non-Alaskan Indians only 
have a right to undisturbed use and occupancy is certainly open to dispute. Congressional 
power over Alaskan native land rights is the key point of Tee-Hit-Ton. 
• 
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The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958159 maintained the status quo. 
Alaska abandoned all claims to lands held in trust for natives by the 
United States and to lands subject to native rights of occupancy and 
use, thereby permitting future control of these lands by Congress. Ifill 
Since the Statehood Act did not permit Alaska to select those lands 
in which natives could prove aboriginal rights based on use and 
occupancy, and since the Act did not contain formal federal recogni-
tion of any such native rights, congressional flexibility for the future 
remained. 
This uncertain state of native land rights ended in 1971 with the 
passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. ISI In return for 
a grant to the natives of fee simple title to forty million acres of land 
and a payment of over $950 million, the Act extinguished all land 
claims based on aboriginal use or occupancy.162 Whether any trust 
responsibility to the Eskimos survived the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act is uncertain. Since discussion of the trust issue by 
the courts often centered around a dispute relating to land, much 
"8 Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). 
II. Section 4 of the Statehood Act includes the following: 
As a compact with the United States said State and its people do agree and declare 
that they forever disclaim all right and title to any lands or other property not granted or 
confirmed to the State or its political subdivisions by or under the authority of this Act, 
the right or title to which is held by the United States or is subject to disposition by the 
United States, and to any lands or other property (including fishing rights), the right or 
title to which may be held by any Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts (hereinafter called natives) 
or is held by the United States in trust for said natives; that all such lands or other 
property (including fishing rights), the right or title to which may be held by said natives 
or is held by the United States in trust for said natives, shall be and remain under the 
absolute jurisdiction and control ofthe United States until disposed of under its authority, 
except to such extent as the Congress has prescribed or may hereafter prescribe, and 
except when held by individual natives in fee without restrictions on alienation. . . 
[d. at § 4. 
"' 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 (1976) . 
.. 2 The Act states: 
All aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and 
occupancy, including submerged land underneath all water areas, both inland and off-
shore, and including any aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that may exist, are hereby 
extinguished. 
[d. § 1603(b). 
All claims against the United States, the State, and all other persons that are based on 
claims of aboriginal right, title, use, or occupancy of land or water areas in Alaska, or that 
are based on any statute or treaty of the United States relating to Native use and occu-
pancy, or that are based on the laws of any other nation, including any such claims that 
are pending before any Federal or state court or the Indian Claims Commission, are hereby 
extinguished. 
[d. § 1603(c). 
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prior judicial language becomes inapplicable. Inquiry must now 
focus on the type of trust responsibility that can exist independent 
of land issues. In the bowhead situation, that entails determining 
whether there exists a federal obligation to protect a subsistence 
culture for the benefit of the Eskimos living in the nine Alaskan 
whaling villages. 
Arguably, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act uses lan-
guage that extinguishes all aboriginal land-related claims, and 
effectively terminates any trust obligation to Alaskan natives if that 
trust obligation is dependent on aboriginal claims to land. 163 The 
Act therefore can be viewed as a repudiation of the entire trust 
philosophy and as a vehicle promoting Alaskan natives from the 
status of "aborigine" to American citizen. 16• Yet, the termination of 
a fe~,U~~~_~~~SP2!l§i,Qility \\'itlu:e~pect to l~~~(~~~s 'nof n~~~~sar-
, iIYextiIlguj!;!h a trUst relationship based on subsistence"-and cultural 
'. n~~~s. Indeed, the Conference Report on,.the Alaska"}·rative"Clalms 
Settlement Act stated that the bill "provided for the protection of 
the Native peoples' interest in and use of subsistence resources on 
the public lands. "165 Legislative actions since 1971 also support the 
continuation of some trust obligation to Alaskan natives. However, 
these same actions also have sought to balance Eskimo subsistence 
183 The House Report on the Act contained the following: 
The section extinguishing aboriginal title and claims based on aboriginal title is intended 
to be applied broadly, and to bar any further litigation based on such claims of title. The 
land and money grants contained in the bill are intended to be the total compensation 
for such extinguishment. 
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1029 (D. Alaska 1977), quoting 
H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971). The Conference Committee stated: 
It is the clear and direct intent of the conference committee to extinguish all aboriginal 
claims and all aboriginal land titles, if any, of the Native people of Alaska and the 
language of settlement is to be broadly construed to eliminate such claims and titles as 
any basis for any form of direct or indirect challenge to land in Alaska. 
Id. quoting CONF. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1971) (emphasis in original). 
16, Cases discussing what was and what was not extinguished by the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act include: Aleut Community of St. Paul Island v. United States, 480 F.2d 831 
(Ct. Cl. 1973) (Aleut group claims title to Aleutian island, citing Russian law, and alleges 
title has been extinguished without compensation); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977) (United States, on behalf of North Slope Eskimos, sues 
State of Alaska and 140 corporations and private parties for trespass on native land prior to 
passage of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act); Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359 
(D. D.C. 1973) (inhabitants of North Slope Eskimo villages assert title to aboriginal land 
selected by the State of Alaska and challenge lease of certain lands for oil development). All 
three cases are important reading for those interested in the effects of the Act. 
185 H.R. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34, 37, reprinted in [1971J U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2247, 2250. 
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needs with the survival of endangered species of wildlife. 
The major piece of legislation which seeks to protect the EskifIlO 
way of life, while at the same time assuring that subsistence hunting 
does not wipe out an endangered species, is the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).'88 This statute establishes a ten-
year moratorium on the taking of any marine mammal without a 
permit,187 yet excepts from that moratorium the taking of marine 
mammals by any Alaskan Indian, Aleut or Eskimo so long as the 
taking is not wasteful and is for subsistence purposes only. However, 
if it is determined that a species of marine mammal hunted by 
natives is "depleted", the taking of that animal may be curtailed 
by regulations restricting native hunting; such regulations must 
pass through a public hearing process and must be removed when 
they are no longer necessary to preserve the endangered species.'"H 
In enacting MMPA, Congress carefully considered the impact 
which curtailment of marine mammal hunting would have on the 
'" 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976). 
'87 Permits are granted on a small scale, generally for takings related to scientific research 
and public display. See generally 50 C.F.R. Part 18 (1977). 
'88 Section 101(b) of MMPA reads as follows: 
The provisions of this [Act] shall not apply with respect to the taking of any marine 
mammal by any Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo who dwells on the coast oBhe North Pacific 
Ocean or the Arctic Ocean if such taking-
(1) is for subsistence purposes by Alaskan natives who reside in Alaska, or 
(2) is done for purposes of creating and selling authentic native articles of handicrafts 
and clothing: Provided, That only authentic native articles of handicrafts and clothing 
may be sold in interstate commerce: And provided further, That any edible portion of 
marine mammals may be sold in native villages and towns in Alaska or for native con-
sumption. For the purposes of this subsection, the term "authentic native articles of 
handicrafts and clothing" means items composed wholly or in some significant respect of 
natural materials, and which are produced, decorated, or fashioned in the exercise of 
traditional native handicrafts without the use of pantographs, multiple carvers, or other 
mass copying devices. Traditional native handicrafts include, but are not limited to, 
weaving, carving, stitching, sewing, lacing, beading, drawing, and painting; and 
(3) in each case, is not accomplished in a wasteful manner. 
Notwithstanding the preceeding provisions of this subsection, when, under this [Actj, 
the Secretary determines any species or stock of marine mammal subject to taking by 
Indians, Aleuts, or Eskimos to be depleted, he may prescribe regulations upon the taking 
of such marine mammals by any Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo described in this subsection. 
Such regulations may be established with reference to species or stocks, geographical 
description of the area included, the season for taking, or any other factors related to the 
reason for establishing such regulations and consistent with the purposes of this [Act]. 
Such regulations shall be prescribed after notice and hearing required by section [103] 
of this title and shall be removed as soon as the Secretary determines that the need for 
their imposition has disappeared. 
16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1976). See also text at notes 92 and 93, supra. 
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subsistence activities and cultural patterns of Alaskan Eskimos. 
During three days of hearings held in Alaska, a Senate subcommit-
tee found that marine mammals served not only as food and clo-
thing, but also as a basis for a small cash economy. It was deter-
mined that crafts and clothing created from marine mammals "are 
a continuing manifestation of ancestoral cultural patterns, and 
must not be extinguished by act of Congress."164 However, when a 
particular species nears extinction, MMPA unequivocally chooses 
protection of a marine mammal over such subsistence and cultural 
activities.I7O This basic policy choice may aid in gauging the limits 
of any trust responsibility that may still survive with respect to the 
Eskimo. 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) 171 was enacted to 
protect all species of wildlife from extinction. The Act contains an 
exemption for Alaskan natives similar to that found in MMPA,172 
thereby further supporting the proposition that congressional policy 
seeks to protect Eskimo subsistence and cultural interests while 
insuring that such action does not lead to the extinction of a species 
of wildlife. 173 
Congress recently readdressed the issue of native subsistence 
needs as it dealt with the problem of the future of Alaska's vast 
areas of public land. Although no bill dealing with Alaskan lands 
emerged from Congress in 1978, both houses did consider such legis-
... s. REP. No. 863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972). 
170 The Conference Committee Report on the bill contained the following: 
The conferees were aware of the relatively small amount of solid data on the eflects of 
native taking of marine mammals, and given that lack of information were not disposed 
unilaterally to terminate the present levels of taking by Alaskan Indians, Aleuts and 
Natives of marine mammals, including endangered species such as bowhead whales. The 
Secretary is given the authority to curtail or to terminate the native taking whenever he 
concludes that such taking is endangering, depleting or inhibiting the restoration of en-
dangered or depleted stocks. The actions of the Secretary in administering the provisions 
relating to taking by natives will be subject to review by the public and by the Congress, 
in order to see that his responsibilities have adequately been met. 
H.R. REP. No. 1488, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. £3 (1972). 
171 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). 
17' 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1976). 
173 The Senate report on the bill that was to substantially become ESA referred to the 
importance of traditional hunting practices both as a means of subsistence and as a way of 
preserving social unity. The report concluded that native hunting was not the principal threat 
to endangered species but noted that the native exemption can be regulated or completely 
revoked if the situation warrants. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973J 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2993. Such adjustment of the ESA exemption is to be carried 
out with a full public hearing process such as that mandated in MMPA. 16 U.S.C. § 
1539(e)( 4)(1976). 
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lation.174 Each proposed bill had a section protecting subsistence use 
of public lands and sought to preserve Alaskan native cultural pat-
terns as much as possible. 175 However, the proposed legislation did 
not seek to artificially perpetuate native culture, but rather to per-
mit individual Eskimos the choice of following traditional or mod-
ern lifestyles. 176 
Thus, the scope of federal trust responsibility to the Eskimos of 
Alaska appears to include the following elements: (1) a basic obliga-
tion to consider Eskimo interests and to construe statutes in favor 
of the Eskimos; and, (2) an intent to permit Eskimos· to continue 
their subsistence way of life and to allow individual Eskimos to 
decide for themselves the extent to which they want to follow tradi-
tionallifestyles, provided, however, that such subsistence activities 
do not result in the extinction of any animal. 
'14 The House passed a bill dealing with Alaska lands, Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act, H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONGo REC. H4312 (1978). The Senate 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources did report out a bill, [1978J 9 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) 1130, which was never passed by the Senate and died in conference. [1978J 9 ENVIR. 
REp. (BNA) 1170. 
175 The bill reported out by the Senate Committee found that: 
in order to fulfill the policies and purposes of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
and as a matter of equity, it is necessary for the Congress to invoke its constitutional 
authority over Native affairs and its constitutional authority under the property clause 
and the commerce clause to protect and provide the opportunity for continued subsistence 
uses on the public lands by Native and non-Native rural residents .... 
Proposed Alaska National Interest Lands ("d2") bill, § 801(4) (reported out of Senate Com-
mittee on Energy and Natural Resources on Oct. 5, 1978). See [1978J 9 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 
1130. The House bill stated that one of its purposes was to: 
provide the opportunity for people engaged in a genuinely subsistence-oriented life style 
to continue to do so if they desire and to allow such people to decide for themselves their 
own degree of subsistence dependency and the rate at which acculturation or adjustment 
to a non-subsiiitence way of life may take place. 
H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 702(1)(1978). 
I7R The House report stated: 
This legislation recognizes the long-standing and historic use of the Alaska Native people 
of large areas of land around their historic villages for hunting, fishing, trapping, berry 
gathering and other subsistence use purposes. This Act is not, however, predicated on the 
philosophy that the historic way of life of the Native people of Alaska can, or will, or 
should be perpetuated into the future for all time by the actions taken by this Congress; 
western "civilization" came to Alaska and to virtually all of the Native people many years 
ago. 
This legislation recognizes, but makes no value judgment concerning the processes and 
the forces of social change which are transforming the historic culture of the Native people 
of Alaska. Congress can, however, give Native people the opportunity to decide for them-
selves the rate at which acculturation will take place. Furnishing protection of subsistence 
patterns of existence wiJI allow Native peoples, especially the older generation, the oppor-
tunity to make that choice. 
H.R. REP. No. 1045, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1978). 
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VIII. THE FUTURE OF THE BOWHEAD CONTROVERSY 
The court in Hopson v. Kreps177 faced the task of balancing the 
interests of the United States in maintaining a viable IWC and in 
assuring the survival of the bowhead against the trust obligation of 
the United States to protect the Eskimo subsistence way of life. The 
district court deemed the entire issue to be a matter of foreign 
policy, declared it lacked jurisdiction, and dismissed the case. If the 
appellate court reverses this decision and remands for consideration 
of the issue of trust responsibility, the district court can analyze the 
situation on the basis of either traditional trust concepts or the 
congressional policy toward Eskimos and the bowhead as demon-
strated in recent federal legislation. 
The fundamental duty of a trustee is strict loyalty to the benefici-
aries of the trust in the management of the trust res. 17K The trustee 
in this case is the federal government, while the beneficiaries of the 
trust are the present and future generations of Eskimos. The trust 
res does not encompass money or land, but the more abstract entity 
of a subsistence culture. In such a context, the trustee is obliged to 
preserve the subsistence way of life for the Eskimos currently inhab-
iting the nine whaling villages and for any of their children who 
choose to continue that lifestyle. Thus, the United States must act 
not only to allow present Eskimo hunting of the bowhead, but must 
also ensure the continued survival of the animal for the use of future 
generations. Preserving the bowhead from extinction would fulfill 
the requirements of the traditional trust concept mandating the use 
of care and skill in the preservation of trust property. m 
Alternatively, the court could interpret congressional policy as 
expressed in recent legislation to require protection of the subsist-
ence needs and cultural patterns of Alaskan natives,. while at the 
same time avoiding the extinction of any animal species. 1Ho To ra-
tionalize such a policy goal, the court could determine that the duty 
of the United States as trustee for the Eskimo subsistence culture 
requires that the federal government ensure that the animals which 
playa part in th~tculture donqtvanish./On £he offierllanQ,tIie) 
court could reason that the' duty of the United States to protect the I 
177 462 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Alaska 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-4151 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 
1979). 
". 2 A. SCOTI, TRusts § 170 (3d ed. 1967). 
,,, Id. § 176. 
"" See text at notes 166-76, supra. 
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Eskimo subsistence way of life becomes secondary when the survival 
of a species is at stake, permitting a "justifiable breach" of the duty 
to preserve Eskimo culture in the name of saving an endangered 
animaVUftoeir'-eifnersnalysis'actions to protect the bowhead would /"-' 
be proper. Indeed, if such actions entailed implementing the IWC 
bowhead quotas through regulations issued under MMPA, no 
breach of trust could, by definition, exist in any case. Congress, 
through such statutes as MMPA, defines the parameters of its trust 
responsibility so that actions limiting Eskimo whaling which are 
taken in conformance with these statutes simply cannot be a breach 
of any trust duty.181 
Assuming that the court determines that the United States must 
act to preserve both the Eskimo lifestyle and the animals on which 
it depends, it then must fashion an appropriate remedy. A long-
term halt to all Eskimo harvesting of the bowhead would, according 
to the Commerce Department, result in a "deleterious impact on 
the culture, economy, and perhaps the health of the Eskimo."lx2 
Indeed, the Interior Department recommended that the United 
States object to the total elimination of aboriginal bowhead whaling 
by IWC on the grounds that such an objection was required to fulfill 
the nation's trust responsibility to the Eskimos.183 Yet a reasonable 
re~whead whaling wouldapp,es.rtobewith,i? therealm i >.,;t 
?f }-pe :rns~ res~bi~fJ and co.~~oE!.-,:"ithpr.~se.nt Unite~ State,~/ 
mitiatlYea.lll IWC to Imit-;-l'alner than ban, EskImo whalmg. . 
A finding tlliiiifie trust responsibility permits a restriction of 
Eskimo whaling activities does not in itself ratify actions taken by 
IWC. Until intensive scientific study establishes the condition of the 
bowhead stock and the effects of Eskimo hunting on the chances of 
the bowhead's survival, all that can be hoped for is a wise policy 
decision that will be least harmful both to the bowheads and the 
Eskimos. The present set of quotas satisfy neither the Eskimos nor 
the conservation community-the scientific basis for choosing be-
tween a quota of twenty whales and a quota of forty whales is mea-
ger indeed and of little consolation to the Eskimos, while a quota of 
twenty whales is unjustifiable to those who argue that any Eskimo 
hunting may make the difference between the slow regeneration of 
the bowhead and the destruction of the species. 
,,, See text at notes 151-57, supra. 
'" 1 FEIS, supra note 3, at 66. 
'83 Mason, supra note 44, at 372. 
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The intention of some Eskimos appears to be to ignore the IWC 
and federal regulations and violate the 1979 quota. IK4 Such a move 
would lead to either federal enforcement action against the Eskimos 
or an embarrassed United States in IWC. Many Eskimos believe 
that the bowhead has become a political football with the Com-
mission and that IWC decisions on bowhead whaling are not dic-
tated by scientific findings. 185 Their conclusion is not inconceivable. 
Most IWC business relates to establishing the levels of commercial 
harvesting of whales, notably sperm whales, by Japan and the So-
viet Union, with the United States leading a drive to cut this com-
mercial whaling. Some nations believe that the American zeal for a 
reduction in commercial whaling levels will itself diminish when 
the United States must defend the hunting of an endangered 
species of whale by its own citizens. If the IWC quotas on bowhead 
harvesting simply result from a political ploy to make the United 
States limit its conservationist demands, and are not based on the 
best scientific data available, then the Eskimos are bearing an 
unfair burden and the United States may be breaching its trust 
responsibilities by implementing such ill-conceived restrictions. 
Eskimo violations of the 1979 quota certainly could be more easily 
rationalized if IWC members are, in fact, twisting evaluations 
emanating from the Scientific Committee in order to serve political 
ends. 
The United States plans to present a proposal to IWC which 
would create an independent regime to deal solely with aboriginal 
whaling. 18ft Such a mechanism could effectively depoliticize the 
issue, although the question remains whether enough IWC members 
can be convinced of the merits of the scheme. 
The many facets of the Eskimo-bowhead drama create such com-
plexity that no easy course of action exists. It is tempting to aban-
don a paternalistic view of the trust responsibility-"we are impos-
ing hardships on you now for your own good and for the good of your 
children"-and to let the judgment of the Eskimos, who know the 
bowhead best, prevail. The Alaskan natives have themselves pro-
posed a program of self-regulation whereby the Eskimos set the 
I •• See ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMMISSION, THE IWC AND BOWHEAD WHALING: AN ESKIMO 
PERSPECTIVE (1978). 
1.5Id. 
I •• See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 16-18, Hopson v. 
Kreps, 462 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Alaska 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-4151 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 
1979). 
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harvest limit before the hunt begins and their hunting methods are 
closely supervised. '87 Although all mankind suffers to an incalcula-
ble degree when a species of life disappears from our planet, perhaps 
the interrelationship between the bowhead and the Eskimo de-
mands that the future of the bowhead be left in knowledgeable 
Eskimo hands. 
However, permitting self-regulation by the Eskimos is not now 
the answer. An attempt must be made to solve the problems of the 
Eskimo and the bowhead within the established IWC structure. For 
the United States to allow IWC to become an empty shell could lead 
to the destruction of many species of whales around the world. In 
order to achieve the proper resolution of this conflict, justice de-
mands both increased scientific research on the bowhead and a fair 
IWC structure for decision-making. The American proposal for an 
independent body within IWC that would oversee aboriginal whal-
ing satisfies these requirements and deserves international support. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Inupiat Eskimos inhabit the northern and western coasts of 
Alaska where for centuries they have hunted the bowhead whale. 
The whale hunt has long been both a source of food and a unique 
cultural activity. However, the bowhead was almost exterminated 
by commercial whalers during the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and the present health of the whale stock is not known. Eskimo 
whaling activities have increased during the 1970's, causing concern 
for the future survival of the bowhead. 
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) has slowly moved 
to protect threatened whale species. In June 1977, IWC voted to halt 
all aboriginal hunting of the bowhead. IWC later changed this total 
ban to a limited quota for the years 1978 and 1979, although the 
Eskimos challenged federal implementation of the IWC decisions, 
arguing that the United States is violating its trust obligation to the 
Eskimo villagers when it restricts their whaling activities. 
The trust responsibility to the Eskimos has a basis in the fidu-
ciary relationship between Indians and the federal government. 
Congress determines the scope of this relationship, and federal offi-
cials must strictly observe the fiduciary duties recognized by Con-
gress. A special trust duty to the Eskimos can be found in recent 
'" See u.s. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BOWHEAD WHALES A-5 (1975). 
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congressional actions expressing a desire to protect the Eskimo 
subsistence culture, but not at the expense of the extermination of 
a species of wildlife. Thus, federal regulation of Eskimo whaling is 
not in violation of the government's trust responsibility toward the 
Alaskan natives, provided unrestricted hunting poses a marked 
threat to the bowhead's survival. 
